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O

ne of the more notorious quotations widely attributed to George W. Bush,
when he was campaigning fo r the presidency of the United States in 2000,
was something lathe effect that "[wJedon't do nation-building." As with many attributed quotations. the actual remark he made was less curt and slightly more
nuanced. What actually happened was that in the course of a presidential debate
with his opponent, Vice President AI Gore, Bush was asked ifhe would have supported US military involvement in the ill-fated expanded United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II ) in 1993-941 had he been president at the time. This
is what he actually said in reply:
[Somalia] [sJtarted off as a humanitarian mission and it changed into a nationbuilding mission, and that's where the mission went wrong. The mission was changed.
And as a result, our nation paid a price. And so I don't think our troops ought to be
used for what's called nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and
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win war. I think our troops ought to be used to help overthrow the dictato r when it's in
our best interests. But in this case [i.e., SomaliaJ it was a nation-building exercise. and
same with Haiti. [2J I wouldn't have supported either.!

This antipathy notwithstanding, and despite former President Bush's best efforts amid the rhetoric of the "Global War on Terror," the realities of the transnational military operational environment in the first decade of the twenty- first
century have produced an exponential growth in the importance of what are now
generally termed stability (or stabilization) operations, to such an extent that even
US military doctrine now acknowledges such operations as "a core U.s. military
mission . .. [to I be given priority comparable to combat operations."4 The Ministry
of Defence in the United Kingdom, whose long experience with so-called "small
wars" in the postcolonial context during the withdrawal from Empire (approximately during the period 1945-65, including conflicts in Palestine, Malaya, Cyprus, Kenya and Aden) has led some foreign observers to suggest a particular
mastery of nation-building and counterinsurgency campaigns,5 has on1y recentlyin Jan uary 2009--circulated a working draft of what will eventually become the
first promulgation of a British doctrine on such operations.6
The current campaign in Afghanistan has been described as "a test case for international deve10pment assistance and bi- and multilateral cooperation'" even in
the midst of sustained combat operations in substantial parts of the country,
whereby "the main problems .. . are restoring security and establishing a functioning state."8 Stability operations seem to have become the catchphrase for a new
generation of military actions: indeed, they have come to be viewed as an essential
stage in the type of conflicts most prevalent today, namely, asymmetric conflicts
between State and non-State actors. In order to win the war it has become essential,
in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, to win the peace, and that is done by stabilizing
the situation in theater after the initial opposition has been defeated or at least contained. 9 The moment of hubris, when President Bush landed on the aircraft carrier
USS Abra},am Lincoln on May I, 2003 and declared that major combat operations
in Iraq had ended, did not in fact herald the conclusion of hostilities in Iraq: the coalition merely swapped one enemy (the State armed forces of the defeated Saddam
Hussein regime) for another (various assorted non-State militias representing different sectors of Iraqi society, along with groups affiliated with AI Qaeda). In Afghanistan, by way of contrast, the main enemy has stayed the same-Le., the
Taliban- but its status changed from being the de facto government in control of
up to 90 percent of Afghan territory in September 200 I, to that of an insurgency
dispersed in (mainly) the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand. Although intensive military operations against the Taliban continue, international
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coalition forces in Afghanistan, acting in concert with the Afghan government of
President Hamid Karzai, are attempting at the same time to contin ue apace with
the reconstruction and development of the country: in a word, nation-building. 10
Military operations in circumstances such as those prevailing in Afghanistan are
situated at the intersections of two major fault lines in public international law:
namely, they are at the junction of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, and simultaneously (within the jus in bello) at the junction of international and non-international
armed conflicts. This article will, first, define stability operations in doctrinal terms
and situate them within an international legal context. The significance of their legitimacy under the jus ad bellum will be briefly considered and related to the context of
Afghanistan before their classification in terms of the international law of arm ed
conflict (LOAC) will be analyzed. The application of the jus in bello to such operations will then be discussed, with reference to some specific operational problems
such as the status and treatment of insurgents captured by coalition forces in Afghanistan, and the targeting of such insurgents. Finally, some tentative conclusions
will be suggested as to the international law applicable to stability operations.

From Peacekeeping to Stability Operations
The phrase "stability operations" may represent, to some extent, new terminology;
but it does emphatically not refer to a new phenomenon in the continuum of military operations. The military doctrinal term previously applied in the United States
and United Kingdom was "military operations other than war" (MOOTW), a term
that somehow always seemed to carty a faint hint of derision but nevertheless was
undeniably useful as a catch-all phrase: in effect, it covered practically the entire
spectrwn of military operations, excluding only all-out "war."ll From the mid1950s until the early 1990s the principal manifestation ofMOOTW was in "classic"
peacekeeping operations undertaken pursuant to UN m andates.
Starting in 1992 with the situation in Som alia, the United Nations began to use
two new terms-"peace enforcement" and "peace building"-which were distinguished from traditional peacekeeping. While peacekeeping involved the interposition of a military force with host State consent in order to supervise ceasefire or
peace agreements already in place, typically with very restrictive rules of engagement that extended no further than authorizing the use of force in self-defense,
peace enforcement cam e to be used to refer to what might be described as a
"beefed-up peacekeeping operation," namely one in which the situation remained unstable enough to allow for an expansion of the permitted use of force
in order to maintain the peace. This wouJd generally occur in situations where the
parties to the confli ct might have reached a ceasefire o r interim peace accord, but
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its observance was too fragile for the interpositional force to preserve a passive
role. Peace enforcement, in other words, was proactive and essentially involved
the international force taking sides in the enforcement of obligations already entered into by the belligerents. 12 Peace building, on the other hand, encompassed a
m uch wider range of activities designed to prevent the resumption or proliferation of a particular conflict, from disarmament and demobilization of the warring
parties to election monitoring, from the strengthening of State institutions to the
promotion of human rights and from the repatriation of refugees to the provision
of humanitarian aid.D UN-mandated missions throughout the 1990s in Somalia,
Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo all had various combinations of the
above list of activities taking place simultaneously. Their salient feat ure for the
purposes of this discussion was that they all took place in conditions of continuing armed conflict or, at the very least, serious civil unrest.
Strangely, however, although the range of activities being assigned to these missions grew and although there was often manifestly no peace to keep, few outside
the United Nations adopted the new terminologies outlined above: within the US
government, fo r example, Congress continued to use the generic term "peacekeeping" to refer to all such operations, while the executive branch adopted the similarly generic "peace operations." In both cases, the inclusion of the word " peace"
was manifestly misplaced since it created the misleading impression that such operations involved comparatively little risk for the military personnel assigned to
them, whereas in fact they often saw soldiers in what amounted to full-scale
warfighting operations. This, coupled with the stigma of failure that came in many
circles to be attached to "'peace operations" in 1990s, contr ibuted-at least on a
psychological level-to the shift in language away from peace and toward stability.
Peace became the endgame, the ultimate objective to be achieved; hence, jus ad
pacem. But the realities on the ground in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, with all
their com plexities and ambiguities, forced a general recognition that in order to
have peace, it is necessary to have stability.
The US Department of Defense currently characterizes stability operations as
"[ m ]ilitary and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to
conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions."14 The US doctrinal
defmition of stability operations ("missions, tasks and activities [that] seek to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential government
services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitar ian relief'IS) is situated within the following contemporary context:
The character of this conflict [i.e., the post-2!XH security environment] is unlike any
other in recent American history, where military forces operating among the people of
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[thel world will decide the major battles and engagements. The greatest threats to our
national security will not come from emerging ambitious states but from nations
unable or unwilling to meet the basic needs and aspirations of their people. Here, the
margin of victory will be measured in far different terms from the wars of our past.
However, time may be the ultimate arbiter of success: time to bring safety and security
to an embattled populace; time to provide for the essential, immediate humanitarian
needs of the people; time to restore basic public order and a semblance of normalcy to
life; and time to rebuild the institutions of government and market economy that
provide the foundations for enduring peace and stability. This is the essence of stability
operations. 16
It is very telling-and very relevant for the assumption of this author, that the
conduct of stability operations must be subject to the international law of armed
conflict-that this description of the context for stability operations explicitly
places them within a continuum of military operations, that is to say, in a spectrum
of activity that in itself is closer to war than to peace.
In the United Kingdom, despite the lack at present of a formally promulgated
doctrine on stability operations, military thinking is very much on the same lines as
that of our US counterparts. Stability operations are understood to be those that
impose security and control in a defined area while restoring and developing infrastructure and selVices, in collaboration with appropriate civilian agencies. They
may involve kinetic or non-kinetic applications of force and may occur before,
during or after major combat operations; or indeed, they may in themselves be the
primary objective of a campaign. Their desired endgame, ultimately, is always to
secure a transition of power and control to the civilian authorities of the host State.
Recently the Chief of the UK General Staff characterized stability operations as
involving "several different lines of operation---ensuring security, rebuilding essential selVices, promoting good governance and facilitating economic regeneration."l7 Discussing future trends for the British armed forces, he said:
Instead of adapting each time we deploy, it is dear from recent experiences that we
should be structured and trained to conduct an Intervention and Stabilisation
operation almost as the default setting, with the right forces and the correctly qualified
personnel with the right training to deliver the right effect from the outset.
And this will require both kinetic and non-kinetic means--there will always be a need
for soldiers who are trained to fight a hostile and implacable enemy, but there will also
be a need for soldiers who are trained to deliver essential services until the situation is
safe enough for civil agencies to engage; so there will be a need for soldiers trained to
deliver humanitarian assistance, to assist with the delivery of local governance!,) and
for soldiers who are experts in the local politics and culture of the area, and who can
therefore initiate the early stages of reconciliation and peace-building. l8

391

Stability Operations and Public International Law
Perhaps the most significant aspect of General Dannatt's remarks is his suggestion that stability operations be regarded "almost as the default setting" for future
British military capabilities. This reflects the British view that "major combat operations" -full-scale inter-State armed conflicts which have as their objective the total defeat of a governmental enemy, leading to its removaJ from power-are very
much the exception in the contemporary paradigm of "fourth-generation warfare." In both the Afghanistan (2001 ) and Iraq (2003) campaigns, operations directed against the State (the TaJiban in the former case, Saddam's armed forces in
the latter) were over remarkably quickly; yet counterinsurgency fighting continues
to this day, alongside attempts to transform the institutions and infrastructure of
these failing States into stable, functioning authorities that are able to maintain law
and order. Whether or not one accepts in abstracto the Bush administration's characterization of the contemporary security environment for America and her allies
as a "long war, "19 ongoing stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have aspects
that definitely amount in effect to "war," even while the stated objective is peace.
Stability operations are nowhere mentioned in international law; neither the jus
ad bellum nor the jus in bello explicitly recognizes the concept. Nevertheless, in
light of the foregoing, it must be stated categorically that a key feature of contemporary stability operations is international legitimacy (as will be seen in the next
section with specific reference to Afghanistan). While legitimacy is not the same
thing as legality, the prevalent view in both the United States and the United Kingdom is that the main framework for international legitimacy is international legality: stability operations must take place on the basis of sound authority in
internationaJlaw, and must be conducted (in their specifically military aspects) in
accordance with the international law of armed conflict.
Stability Operations and the Legality of the Use of Force

Two salient feat ures of contemporary stability operations are that they tend to be
(1) multilateral, i.e., conducted by coalitions, whether ad hoc or (preferably)
within the framework of an established military alliance, like the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO); and (2) legitimate, i.e., constituting a lawful use of
force under either the UN Charter or customary international law-normally the
former, since no stability operations as presently understood have taken place on
such a controversial legal basis as the doctrine ofhwnanitarian intervention, for
instance. Current operations in Afghanistan will hereinafter be taken as the case
study for discussion of stability operations and international law.
Although US and coalition forces first commenced military action against the
Taliban militia and AI Qaeda elements in Afghanistan in Operation Enduring
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Freedom (OEF) on October 7, 2001 pursuant to the right of individual and collective self-defense as recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter (for which no Security Council mandate is legally required), and OEF continues to this day primarily
in southern and eastern Afghanistan, internationally-mandated forces were first
deployed to the country only in December 2001, after the Taliban had been ejected
from its seats of power. The last main Taliban urban stronghold, Kandahar, was
captured by coalitio n forces on Decem ber 7, two days after the signing of the Bonn
Agreement, in which delegations of various Afghan political factions committed
themselves to cooperation in the establish ment of an In terim Authority that would
rebuild the Afghan State after decades of conflict.20 The Bonn Agreement specifically requested the Security Council
to consider autho rizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations
mandated force. This force will assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its
surrounding areas. Such a force could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded to
other urban centres and other areas .... It would also be desirable if such a force were to
assist in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan's infrastructure. 2L

On December 19 two letters arrived at UN headquarters: one from the Afghan
Minister for Foreign Affairs and the other from his British coun terpart. The former stated somewhat opaquely that the envisaged international security force
"could be deployed under Chapter VI or VII of the Charter."22 T he latter expressed
the UK's willingness to serve as the initial lead nation for the proposed deployment, known as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with the core
missions of ( I ) assisting the establishment of the Interim Administration of Afghanistan in liaison with the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in
Kabul; (2) providing advice and support to the Afghan administration and the
United Nations in Kab ul on security issues; and (3) preparing for the establishment
and training of new Afghan national armed and security forces, key infrastructure
developm ent "and possible future expanded security assistance in other parts of
Afghanistan. " 23 1be British letter did not refer to specific chapters or articles o f the
UN Charter as the legal basis for the proposed deployment, but stated that it would
be "based on the willingness expressed [on the part of the Afghan administration 1
to receive such a fo rce and an authorizing Security Council resolution. "24 The letter
also emphasized that the proposed international force "will have a particular mission authorized by a Security Council resolution that is d istinct from O peration
Enduring Freedom."25 One day later, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VI I
of the Charter, passed the resolution referred to in the British letter and authorized
the establishment, for an initial six months, of ISAF.26 Apart from assisting in the
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maintenance of security in Kabul and surrounding areasP the only other task expressly mandated to ISAF at this stage was "to provide assistance to help the Afghan
Interim Authority in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and
armed forces. "28 As far as the use of force by the mission was concerned, the Resolution authorized ISAF troop-contributing nations (TCNs) to take "all necessary
measures to fulfil its mandate."29
At this stage, therefore, ISAF was clearly an ad hoc "coalition of the willing"
formed by mandate of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, with
the use of force authorized in terms whose broad ambit recalls Article 42 of the
Charter ("such action ... as may be necessary"). The emphasis by the British-and
other TCNs--on Afghan consent to the operation, however, would seem to militate against ISAF being an Article 42 enforcement action, since such actions are
mandatory in nature and do not require host State consent. It would plainly be absurd to classify the ISAF mission as classic peacekeeping, because of the extent of
actual fi ghting that was taking place in Afghanistan at the time of the force's initial
deployment and that continues to this day. Perhaps better-albeitstill imperfectanalogies might be the UN's enforcement actions in respect to Korea (1950), the
Congo (1960) and Haiti (2004). The first case, that of Korea, was in fact the first instance in which the phrase "coalition of the willing" came to be used in the context
of UN enforcement actions. Following the invasion of the Republic of Korea
(ROK) by the forces of the Democratic People's Republic and the ROK's appeal to
the UN for help, Resolution 83 of the Security Council recommended "that the
Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as
may be necessary to repel the [North Korean ] armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.">O The result was three years of intensive hostilities, but the UN-ROK forces were not organized into a UN mission as such, nor
was their contribution mandatory: it should be remembered that Resolution 83
merely recommended that UN member States provide military assistance to the
ROK. Moreover, there was no civilian component and the operation was a classic
warfighting campaign, with none of the reconstruction and development activities
associated with stability operations.
In the second case the United Nations, having received a request fo r military assistance from the Prime Minister of the newly-independent Congo in the face of
Belgian military intervention and the attempted secession of the province of
Katanga, authorized the Secretary-General "to take the necessary steps ... to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until ... the
[Congolese] national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the [Congolese]
Government, to meet fully their tasks.")] A subsequent resolution on the same
matter urged "that the United Nations take im mediately all appropriate measures
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to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangemen ts for
cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the
use of force, if necessary, in the last resort. "32 Although the resulting force, the Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo, was officially a peacekeeping mission, it did
become involved in actively suppressing the Katangese secessionists, thereby taking sides in a way that peacekeeping missions do not normally do. A rem arkably
complex operation for the time, with large civilian and technical components
alongside military troops, it eventually came to n umber some twenty thousand officers and men.
The third case is perhaps the closest analogy to the deployment of ISAF: the Security Council created the Mission des Nations Unies pour fa stabilisation en Hai"ti
(MINUSTAH) in 2004,33 a decade after authorizing a multinational force to intervene and effect " regime change." MINUSTAH is Brazilian -led and comprises some
nine thousand personnel, with both military and civilian components; its wideranging tasks include ensuring a secure and stable environmen t (including reforming the Haitian National Police and protecting civilians from imminent threat o f
physical violence), supporting the constitutional and political p rocess ( including
the administration of elections and the extension of State authority and good governance at all levels throughout Haiti), the promot ion and protection of human
rights}! and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance. 35 Within that framework,
in 2004-05 MlNUSTAH personnel executed large-scale military raids, using lethal
force, on the slum o f Cite Soleil in the capital city of Port-au-Prince (an anarchic
area in which armed gangs roam the streets shooting, looting, raping and kidnapping), with subsequent allegations of excessive collateral damage;36 M INUSTAH
soldiers have been killed, also.
In Afghanistan, strategic command, control and coordination of ISAF was assumed unilaterally by NATO on August 11,2003,37 and it remains a NATO operation to the presen t time-still separate from the American-led OEF, which has a far
smaller number ofTCNs and is not being executed within the framework of an international organization. The Afghan government immediately approved of
NATO's assumption of the ISAF mandate and, indeed, addressed a formal request
to the Security Council to expand the mandate so as to per mit deploymen ts of lSAF
outside the Kabul area;38 thus host State consent has continued to be a crucial element of the legal basis for stability operations in Afghanistan. This was then acknowledged and formalized by the Security Council in Resolution 1510, which
authorized the expansion oflSAF's mandate and the continued use of all necessary
measures to fulfill that mandate. 39 The ISAF mandate is renewable at yearly intervals, the latest Security Council authorization at the time of writing dating from
September 22, 2008 .40 Curren t troop levels are approximately 55, 100, supplied by a
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total of forty-o ne States under NATO leadership,4! Particularly prominent am ong
ISAF's activities for some years have been the Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs), which operate at a local level to rebuild infrastructure. 42 With the increasing emphasis on the need to transfer more and more capability and power in the
field of security to the Afghan National Army (ANA), a major aspect oflSAF's operations now is the Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams, which are deployed to
ANA partner-units across the country, with the objective of training and
mentoring the ANA in its capability for independent operational deployments, coordinating ISAF-ANA liaison and ensuring the provision of enabling support to
ANA units.H
The basis ofISAF's stability operations in international law appears uncertain to
the extent that such operations are nowhere mentioned in the UN Charter, nor do
they exist as a clear concept recognized by customary international law. Rather,
they are a military doctrinal construct that reflects the realities of the types of operations being carried out in environm ents like that of Afghanistan, where conflicts
are ongoing but international efforts are being made to shore up the legitimate
government and increase its capabilities. ISAF is characterized by NATO as deriving from a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter, despite
the fact that it is a "coalition of the willing" rather than a UN force.44 In that sense,
it is quite different from the operations mandated in Congo and Haiti discussed
earlier. Comparisons with the UN-ROK forces fighting in Korea, the original "coalition of the willing," would be more helpful were it not for the fact that the latter
had no elem ent of stabilization, but were simply charged with fighting a full -scale
war against external aggression by other States: the intra-State, asymmetric and
counterinsurgency aspects so prominent in Afghanistan were entirely absent in
Korea. Official British pronouncements on the legal authority for ISAF are sparse,
but emphasize the combination of an invitation from the democratically elected
government of Afghanistan and the mandate provided by the UN Security Council
in Resolution 151 0. 45
We may surmise from the above that stability operations are an emerging concept in the international law governing the use offorce and are thus effectively sui
get/eris: they have not been previously recognized in customary law and have no explicit basis in the UN Charter or other treaties--except for ad hoc specific cases like
(in relation to Afghanistan ) the Bonn Agreement. However, appreciation of their
legitimacy, through a combination of post-conflict morality and executive legal
authority, is regarded as essential by States that participate in such operations. 46
They in fact represent a peculiar combination of what might be termed "invited intervention" and "authorized intervention"-itlvited by the host State and authorized by an international organization. Therefore, we may suggest that the jus ad
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bellum legal basis of stability operations will differ from case to case, but will normally have in common the following features: ( I ) an invitation by the internationally legitimate government of the host State; (2) a mandate (even if postdating the
actual start of the operation) from an international organization, ideally the
United Nations; and (3) a multilateral coalition, either within the framework of an
existing military alliance such as NATO, or on an ad hoc basis.
Whether stability operations could eventually take place absent one or more of
the above features must be a matter of some legal uncertainty. In Operation Palliser
in May 2000, the United Kingdom unilaterally planned and executed a limited military intervention in Sierra Leone, initially for the purpose of evacuating British,
Commonwealth and European Union citizens at risk from the escalating threat to
the capital, Freetown, from the advancing insurgent forces of the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF). The noncombatant evacuation operation having been successfully accomplished, the British government then expanded the operationagain, unilaterally-and the troops retained control of the international airport,
enabled the safe delivery of UN humanitarian aid into Sierra Leone, and provided
security and stability in Freetown by patrolling the capital. 47 Operation Palliser was
terminated on June 15,2000, although the United Kingdom continued extensive
in volvement in ongoing multinational UN efforts to bring peace and secu rity to
Sierra Leone.
The government of Sierra Leone did not comment publicly on the British action; neither did the subsequent debates in the British House of Commons48 and
the House of Lords,49 nor in the UN Security Council,so make any overt reference
to the legality of the British intervention. Aside from the United Kingdom, eight
States expressed approval of the Brit ish action in the Security Council,5l as did
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, although he made an oblique reference to the "limited mandate" of the British troops.52 Following its last meeting to discuss the escalating crisis in Sierra Leone prior to the British deployment, the Security Council
had issued a presidential statement in which it "call[ed] upon all States in a position to do so to assist" the UN forces already present in Sierra Leone, which might
arguably have been a code that could reasonably have been interpreted as permitting State intervention without the need for any furthe r authority from the UN P
although neither the Secretary-General nor any of the States in the Council expressed any views to that effect. None of the Council members that failed explicitly
to endorse the British intervention actually commented on it at all publicly, so their
real views on the matter must remain a subject of debate; but they d early acquiesced in it. It should be noted that Operation Palliser was not a stability operation
ab initio, although it did acquire characteristics thereof in the course of its execution. It was not requested by the host State, nor did it have a mandate from the
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United Nations, although it was made in support of the UN peacekeeping mission
already p resen t in Sierra Leone (many of whose personnel were at the time being
held hostage by the RUF). The e1ement of morality-or perceived legitimacy-was
undoubtedly present, and the operation was lawful on the basis that it was a limited
humanitarian intervention for the protection of UK nationals and others for
whom the United Kingdom had consular responsibilities; but its legality qua stability operation cannot be conclusively afftrmed.

Stability Operations and the International Law of Armed Conflict
Just as stability operations are not mentioned in the international law governing
the use of force, so, as a military doctrinal concept rather than a legal construct as
such, they are equally absent from the international LOAC. To the extent that stability operations do not involve any actual armed hostilities, in their peaceful and
civilian aspects, they evidently are not governed by the LOAC at all. The LOAC applies only in armed conflicts, which are generically defined in customary internationallaw as existing
whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of
such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general
conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement
is achieved. Until that moment, international hwnanitarian law continues to apply in
the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole
territory under the control of a party [to the conflict], whether or not actual combat
takes place there. 54

It would seem very clear, from the above descriptors, that an armed conflict
continues to take place in certain parts of Afghanistan (primarily the south and east
of the country) between the ANA and lSAF on the one hand, and insurgents
(mostlyTaliban ) on the other. The law which governs the behavior ofISAF troops
in other parts of the country, which have seen relatively sustained peace for some
time now, will be considered furth er below. But to the extent that an armed conflict
is taking place in certain parts of Afghanistan, it is governed by the LOAC and it is
necessary to consider what type of conflict that might constitute, as the applicable
rules differ to som e extent between international and non-international armed
conflicts.
International armed conflicts are d efined in Common Article 2 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions as
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all cases of declared war o r of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not re1:ognized by one
of them ... [and) all cases of partial o r total occupation of the territory of a High
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.

There is patently no armed conflict between two or more States in Afghanistan,
since ISAF forces are present in the territory at the invitation of the State itself and
are assisting the State against the insurgents. Nor could it conceivably be said that
there is a " partial or total occupation of the territory" by ISAF, since that would
require that the territory be under the effective control of the occupier, either following the complete defeat of the lawful sovereign (debellatio ) or because the invading force has temporarily asserted its author ity over the territory (belligerent
occupation). In Afghanistan, ISAF has not occupied the territory belligerently visa-vis the current Afghan government, with which it is allied; and in those areas
where it operates, it does so emphatically in support of the Afghan government and
not on its own account.
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions in 1977 extended the scope of
application in respect to international armed conflicts to "armed conflicts in which
peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against
racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determinatio n."'s Article 96(3)
then provides for an "authority representing a people engaged against a high contracting party in an arm ed conflict of the type referred to in [Article I (4)] " to m ake
a unilateral declaration undertaking to apply the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I. The Taliban has not sought to take advantage of these provisions,
and even if it did, the argwnent could be defeated easily enough o n the basis that
the rights and obligations of the 1949 Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol only take effect following a unilateral declaration under Article 96(3) on a basis
of reciprocity, i.e., the high contracting party in q uestion must also have assumed
the same rights and obligations under the same instruments. In the case of Afghanistan, the State is not a party to Additional Protocol I, and it is hard to see how these
provisions could be binding upon ISAF States, even to the extent that (like the
United Kingdom) they are parties to the Protocol.
If a conflict is not international in nature, then it must-if only by default-be
non-international in nature. Non-international armed con flicts are defined in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as "armed conflict [s] not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,"
which is essentially a negative definition. The notoriously high threshold of application fo r 1977 Additional Protocol II further requires that the conflict be
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in the territory or a High Contracting Party between its armed rorces and dissident
armed forces or other organized armed gro ups which, under responsible command,
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained
and concerted military operations and to implement this ProtocoL 56

Quite apart from the fact that Afghanistan is not a high contracting party to Additional Protocol II , it is doubtful, in any case, whether the conditions for the applicability of the Protocol would be met by the present stability operations in
Afghanistan. Article 1( 1) refers only to the armed forces of the high contracting
party ot! its OWtl territory, which would not cover ISAF; and while the Taliban undoubtedly does have control of some territory and carries out "sustained and concerted military operations," it is most unlikely that it couJd be considered to be
"under responsible command" and it has given no sign of willingness to implement the Protocol.
The defauJt position under the treaties that constitute the bulk of the LOACparticularly the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols-would
therefore seem to be that stability operations in Afghanistan that involve "resort to
armed force ... or protracted armed violence" in terms of the Tadic formuJation57
are neither an international nor a non-international armed conflict, properly
speaking. Instead, they amount to "armed conflict not of an international character" in terms of Common Article 3.58 The trouble with that approach, logical
though it may be on the text of the treaties, is that Common Article 3, being the
"minim um yardstick" for humanitarian protection in all armed conflicts, as recognized by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case,59 is notoriously
vague, imprecise and of the utmost generality. It is for this reason that the recent
approach of the Supreme Court of Israel, to the effect that Israeli military operations against Palestinian militants are subject to the law of international armed
conflicts/>41 is in the opinion of the present author much to be preferred.
The main basis for this finding, that the military capabilities of Palestinian militant organizations are such as to equate their threat with that which might emanate
from a State's armed forces, is at least as true in respect to the Taliban as it is in respect to Hamas. The Israeli court also concluded that the conflict between Israel
and the Palestinians should be treated as international in nature for the purposes of
the LOAC on the basis of the transnational nature of the military operations in
question: they were crossing the internationally recognized frontiers of the State of
Israel and were related to the context oflsrael's belligerent occupation of the Palestinian territories since 1967.61 Although, as noted above, the aspect of belligerent
occupation is not relevant in the case of ISAF and Afghanistan, the fact of deployment of NATO troops across international frontiers in the territory of another
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State could, by analogy, arguably be sufficient to bring ISAF stability operations
within the dictum of the Israeli court.
In light of the above theoretical observations, what practical conclusions may be
drawn as to the LOAC rules or principles to be applied by ISAF during combat operations in Afghanistan? In respect to the conduct of hostilities by ISAF troops, the
force commander has recently directed that "[a]1I responses [to dear and identified
danger] must be proportionate and the utmost of care [sic] should be taken to minimize any damage."62 No doubt sensitive to recurrent Afghan complaints of excessive collateral damage caused by airstrikes, he added:
We are engaged in a counterinsurgency in an extremely demanding environment. We
are fighting an enemy that often cannot be identified before he has struck and then
once he has, he hides among the civilian population. The battle is often waged among
civilians and their property. We must clearly apply and demonstrate proportionality,
requisite restraint, and the utmost discrimination in our application of firepower. No
one seeks or intends to constrain the inherent right of self defense of every member of
the ISAF force. However, Commanders must focus upon the principles which attach to
every use of force-------be that self defense o r offensive fires. Good tactical judgment,
necessity, and proportionality are to drive every action and engagement; minimizing
civilian casualties is of paramount importance. 63

If there are difficulties in applying specific treaty instruments of the LOAC to multinational coalition operations, the directive just cited , in its emphasis on the fundamental principles of necessity, proportionality and discrimination, suggests that
at a minimum the customary rules of the LOAC derived from those principles are
applicable. 64
In respect to the protection of victims and treatment of persons hors de combat,
it may be suggested in line with the above reasoning that Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions applies as the "minimum yardstick" of humanitarian
treatment:
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who
have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness. wounds,
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without
any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth,
or any other similar criteria.

Although there have been reports recently of some unhappiness expressed by British
service personnel at the fact that wounded Taliban fighters are being treated in the
same operating theaters and in the same field hospital wards as wounded British
soldiers,6s it should be noted that this is no less than what is required by Common
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Article 3 and Articles 12- 15 of Geneva Convention 1.66 As regards civilians, Article
4 of Geneva Convention IV provides that "[ pJersons protected by the Convention
are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves,
in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.» Since the stipulation in Article 4 is
disjunctive ("conflict oroccupation"), it would seem clear that Afghan civilians detained by ISAF troops could be covered by its provisions. In respect to captured
Taliban fighters, the simplest expedient under the scheme established in Geneva
Convention III would be either to classify them as prisoners of war (POWs) under
Article 4(A) (2) (which is most unlikely because of their probable failure to satisfy
the conditions stated therein), or to treat them as if they were POWs pending adjudication of their status under the LOAC by a competent tribunal under Article 5. 67
The above discussion has centered on the type of armed conflict, if any, that
subsists during the present stability operations in Afghanistan, and the rules and
principles of the law of anned conflict to be applied to the conduct of ISAF thereunder. But it is entirely possible that in any given place and at any given time in Afghanistan, the situation may be stable and secure, and ISAF troops may
accordingly not be involved in any armed conflict at all for the purposes of application of the LOAC. Although detailed analysis of the law applicable to ISAF in such
situations is essentially beyond the scope of this piece, recent case law from the
United Kingdom, arising from obligations under the European Convention on H uman Rights (ECHR) as incorporated into UK domestic law by the Human Rights
Act 1998 (HRA), requires that the likely position showd be at least briefly noted.
The full implications of the House of Lords decision in R (o n the application ofA/Skeini) v. Secretary of State for Defence,6il already commented upon by the present
author in a previous edition of this series,69 remain a matter of some uncertainty.
For all that, it seems fairly clear that British troops deployed outside the United
Kingdom on combat operations may be subject, in certain circumstances, to the
provisions of the ECHR and the HRA. However, none of the cases decided so far in
the British courts concerning the application of human rights law arise from the
specific situation of Afghanistan and, indeed, all are materially distinguishable
from the Afghan situation in one way or another. The AI-Skeini case, for example,
arose in the context of British operations in Iraq at a time when that country was
generally recognized to be in a state of belligerent occupation; as already indicated
above, belligerent occupation is not relevant to Afghanistan at all. In the Behrami
and Saramati cases, the European Court of Human Rights found certain actions
(and, therefore, potential violations of the ECHR) by the multinational force in
Kosovo since 1999 to be directly imputable to the United Nations itself, rather than
to the individual TCNs. But that was in the context of an operation over which the
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Security Council retained ultimate authority and control, with very specific allocation of tasks (Le., de-mining) in the relevant Security Council resolution and in a
territory that had neither sovereignty nor effective government of its own at the
material time.7° In Afghanistan, by contrast, the relevant resolutions do not allocate detailed specific tasks, authority and control rests with NATO and the North
Atlantic Council, and Afghanistan remains a sovereign State with a legitimate government. Finally, two recent English cases7l concerning liability for human rights
violations in circumstances where British troops had actual custody of civilian detainees in Iraq again largely turn on detailed obligations under relevant Security
Council resolutions (which are not applicable in the case of Afghanistan), their interaction with broader obligations under customary international law and the effect of Article 103 of the UN Charter.72
The AI-Skeini case is currently on appeal to the European Court of Hwnan
Rights so its final legal effect is likely to remain of uncertain scope and ambit for
some time yet. At present, therefore, the most that can be asserted on the basis of
current case law is that British forces on stability operations will be required to apply the ECHR and HRA if they are in belligerent occupation of territory and to persons under their effective control for the purposes of jurisdiction under the human
rights instruments (which, as the House of Lords decided in AI-Skeini, is a higher
standard than effective control under the LOAC and will essentially require British
troops to have actual custody of civilian detainees). For reasons explained be1ow,
these conditions do not obtain in current stability operations in Afghanistan and
are most unlikely ever to do so.

Conclusion: The United Kingdom and Stability Operations
Every State will take a different view on the detennination of the existence of a state
of armed conflict and the nature thereof. Generally the approach of the United
Kingdom is to be as vague as possible concerning the legal classification of military
operations in which British forces are engaged and to concentrate instead on the legal basis for such operations. Thus, statements from the British Ministry of Defence on the deployment and use of British troops in Afghanistan do not refer to
their participation in an armed conflict in that country, merely to the fact that they
are present as part ofISAF under the aegis of NATO, with a brief to aid reconstruction and with the approval of the UN Security Council. 73 The general position in
the United Kingdom is that the determination of a state of armed conflict is a policy decision to be made by the government and one that "depends upon the status
of the parties to the conflict, and the nature of the hostilities. "74 Thus, each individual situation needs to be examined separately on the basis of its own facts-the
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actors and the nature of the hostilities-to detennine if it amounts to an armed
conflict or not. This decision may also be made by the judiciary in the course oflegal proceedings, if relevant. 75
As far as the British position on the nature of an armed conflict is concerned,
again as a matter of both law and doctrine, any such determination must be done
on a case-by-case basis, depending on the facts in each given situation.76 The legal
basis of the decision for UK authorities will be the international law definitions of
international and non-international armed conflicts referred to above, in conjunction with the facts on the ground. If British forces are in action against the government or other official forces of any other State, the situation will be classified as one
of international ar med conflict-a decision made all the easier by the fact that virtually every State in the world is now a high contracting party to the Geneva Conventions. In any other situation in which British troops are deployed, the situation
will be regarded as one of de facto non-international armed conflict. Thus, from
the official point of view of the United Kingdom, the ongoing hostilities in Afghanistan and Iraq are in effect treated as internal conflicts in which UK forces are participating on the side of the governments of those States. The conflict in
Afghanistan after the removal of the Taliban from de facto power in December
2001 is not considered to be a conflict between the British and Afghan States; it is
between Afghan insurgents and the Afghan State, and the latter (with the sanction
of the UN Security Council) invited British troops, along with those of other
NATO States, to assist it in combating the insurgency, maintaining or restoring law
and order, and assisting with reconstruction and development.
Although this position might seem counterintuitive-how can forces of one
State be engaged in hostilities in another State, against foreign nationals, yet the
conflict not be regarded as an international one?-it is in fact not devoid of sense
from a strictly legal perspective. If the British and Afghan States are not at war with
each other, but there is a conflict going on in Afghanistan, it cannot be international according to the definitions in the Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocol I; therefore, by default, it m ust be " not international. " Whether it is then
governed by Common Article 3 or by Additional Protocol II will depend, as far as
British authorities are concerned, on whether the non-State party to the conflict is
fighting under responsible command, has control of territory and is able to implement Additional Protocol 11.77 Again, this will be a policy decision made by the
government. 78
As for the specific rules oflaw applicable to British forces in Afghanistan, if those
forces are engaged in actual armed hostilities, particular rules of the LOAC will apply as above. In respect to targeting operations, the United Kingdom as a matter of
policy applies the rules concerning target selection and precautions in attack that
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are contained in Additional Protocol I to all military operations, irrespective of the
classification of the anned conflict in question. 79 In respect to detainees, given the
UN mandate and the general context of stability operations in Afghanistan, British
policy is to surrender all detainees to the Afghan authorities as quickly as possible
after processing. 80 This latter policy may in due course be exposed to legal challenge, on the basis of concerns that the detainees' human rights may be violated in
Afghan custody and in light of the UK's obligation of non-refoulement under the
ECHR, as discussed particularly in the very recent decision in AI-Saadoon and

Mufdhi.sl
Finally, is should be borne in mind that under the military law of the United
Kingdom,S2 British troops remain subject to the ordinary criminal law of the land
wherever in the world they may be deployed and irrespective of whether or not
they are deployed in a situation of anned conflict. Throughout the so-called
"Troubles" in Northern Ireland (1969-2007), the use offorce by British troops
providing support to the civil authority was regulated by the ordinary criminal law,
resulting in periodic trials of individual British soldiers (who had been accused of
using excessive force) on charges of murder or manslaughter. The same principles
apply when the deployment is to a territory outside the United Kingdom. In Bid v.
Ministry of Defence,83 it was accepted in principle that aspects of civil law-notably
the torts of negligence and trespass to the person--could also be applicable in situations where British troops deployed on certain types of operation abroad could be
shown to have a duty of care toward any persons killed or wounded as a result of
their actions. It was emphasized that this will not be the case in full combat operations,St but it may very well turn out to be relevant to stability operations.
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